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Sifting Through the Arbitrators 
For The Woman, The Minority, 
The Newcomer1 
Douglas Pilawa* 
This Note examines the process of choosing an arbitrator 
in international arbitration. Much of the debate and criticism of 
this process addresses the lack of diversity in arbitral tribunals 
around the world. Diversity in this context means not only 
traditional diversity (i.e. gender, race, ethnicity), but also the 
basic idea of adding “fresh faces” to arbitral tribunals.   
Yet the ethical obligation to provide a client with the best 
chance to prevail encourages counsel to choose a familiar, well-
known name with an established “track record” over a little-
known “dark horse.” This tension illustrates a fundamental 
point of friction in international arbitration: choosing 
experienced arbitrators or “fresh faces,” and which group 
ensures continued success of international arbitration as a 
dispute-resolution system. This Note argues that much of the 
debate and the calls to action are unconvincing for two reasons. 
First, the unsupported arguments used to justify proactive 
efforts to diversify arbitral tribunals frustrate skeptics from 
seeing the actual benefits that diversity could bring. Second, the 
yearly surveys that state the same findings—that arbitral 
tribunals are not diverse enough—are crucially misdirected. 
Instead, the groups behind those surveys would be better served 
to show how diversity of arbitral tribunals could solve other 
problematic areas in international arbitration—like lengthy 
proceedings and rising costs. Once clients and counsel alike 
begin to take notice of diversity’s collateral effect, the 
subsequent natural shift to a more diverse arbitrator pool will 
occur and prove sustainable for the health of the whole system. 
  
 
1. CHARLES BUKOWSKI, SIFTING THROUGH THE MADNESS FOR THE WORD, 
THE LINE, THE WAY: NEW POEMS (John Martin ed., 2004). 
* J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, Cleveland, 
Ohio, May 2019; Master 2 Candidate, Droit européen et international des 
affaires, Université Paris-Dauphine, Paris, France, May 2019; B.A., English 
and French Language & Literature, Skidmore College, May 2008. 
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Introduction 
Throughout the rise of international arbitration’s place in the 
legal world, insiders and outsiders have observed that the same names 
continue to dominate arbitral tribunals across the globe.2 These high-
profile arbitrators sit in judgment of arbitrations with staggering 
 
2. Lisa Bench Nieuwveld, Choosing the Weathered Veteran or the Young 
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amounts of money at stake.3 In investor-state arbitration, the 
ramifications of an arbitral proceeding can go beyond money; 
sometimes an entire country’s political system is implicated.4 In a 
system that promotes party autonomy and unfettered freedom, how is 
it, then, that the same people dominate these tribunals? Arbitrators 
are not elected like a U.S. Federal Judges—they do not serve lifetime 
tenures.5 This phenomenon has exacerbated the claim that 
international arbitration is an insular club of a few privileged elite.6 
Some have even referred to this group of international arbitrators as a 
mafia—a corrupt inner circle of lawyers and arbitrators who trade 
appointments for financial gain and professional prestige.7  
Admittedly, seeing the same private individuals ruling on million 
and billion dollar claims behind closed doors objectively raises an 
eyebrow. Who are these arbitrators and why do they always decide 
these cases? This innocuous inquiry reveals an intense debate over the 
lack of diversity in international arbitral tribunals.8 While some 
approach the subject with reservation, others claim that the 
continued existence of international arbitration depends upon 
increased diversity.9 In general, efforts to regulate the arbitration 
selection process10 receive praise and criticism.11 Parties who welcome 
 
3. See Stephen P. Anway, Advocacy in International Arbitration, in THE 
GUIDE TO ADVOCACY 117 (Stephen Jagusch QC et al. eds., 2016) 
(discussing the high stakes involved in international arbitration). 
4. See Hans Smit, The Pernicious Institution of the Party-Appointed 
Arbitrator, in COLUMBIA FDI PERSPECTIVES: PERSPECTIVES ON TOPICAL 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT ISSUES BY THE VALE COLUMBIA CENTER ON 
SUSTAINABLE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT No. 33 (Karl P. Sauvant et 
al. eds., 2010) (discussing how decisions in investor-state arbitrations 
can affect the state and its people). 
5. Compare U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, with Catherine A. Rogers, The 
Vocation of the International Arbitrator, 20 Aᴍ. U. Iɴᴛ’ʟ L. Rᴇᴠ. 957, 
959 (2005). 
6. Charles Nairac, Due Process Considerations in the Constitution of 
Arbitral Tribunals, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND THE RULE OF 
LAW: CONTRIBUTION AND CONFORMITY 119, 140. (Andrea Menaker ed., 
2017). 
7. Sam Luttrell, Chapter 1: Bias in International Commercial Arbitration, 
in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THE NEED FOR A “REAL DANGER” 
TEST 1, 5 (Kluwer Law International ed., 2009). 
8. See generally Ricardo Dalmaso Marques “To Diversify or Not to 
Diversify”? Report on the Session Who Are the Arbitrators?, in 
LEGITIMACY: MYTHS, REALITIES, CHALLENGES, 579 (Albert Jan van den 
Berg ed., 2015) (providing a short, but thorough look into the diversity 
questions typically addressed in any critique of the subject matter).  
9. Id. 
10. For example, the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in 
International Arbitration were introduced in 2004 to address disclosure 
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this change perceive the efforts as an attempt to rectify certain 
wrongs in the system.12 Others, however, view these sorts of efforts as 
infringing upon the sacrosanct freedom that international arbitration 
promises13—the same freedom that has largely contributed to its 
success as the premier dispute resolution mechanism for cross-country 
disputes.14  
 
obligations for arbitrators. In its own words, “[t]he 2004 Guidelines 
reflected the view that the standards [of disclosure] existing at the time 
lacked sufficient clarity and uniformity in their application. “The 
Guidelines, therefore, set forth some ‘General Standards and 
Explanatory Notes on the Standards’. Moreover, in order to promote 
greater consistency and to avoid unnecessary challenges and arbitrator 
withdrawals and removals, the Guidelines list specific situations 
indicating whether [certain conflicts of interest] warrant disclosure or 
disqualification of an arbitrator.” Int’l Bar Assoc. [IBA], Guidelines on 




11. See Margaret Moses, The Role of the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of 
Interest in Arbitrator Challenges, WOLTERS KLUWER (Nov. 23, 2017), 
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2017/11/23/role-iba-
guidelines-conflicts-interest-arbitrator-challenges/ 
[https://perma.cc/JL3T-V5PC] (noting that “the Guidelines, even 
though non-binding, have become quite influential in the face of 
increasing challenges to international arbitrators and awards on the 
basis of arbitrator conflicts. The Guidelines are frequently viewed by 
courts and arbitral institutions as providing relevant criteria for 
assessing the impartiality and independence of a challenged 
arbitrator.”); but see Will Sheng Wilson Koh, Think Quality Not 
Quantity 34 J.INT’L ARB. 711 (2017) (taking issue with the quantitative 
approach that the IBA Guidelines uses with respect to certain aspects of 
the arbitrator selection process, most notably, repeat appointments). 
12. See generally Samaa A.F. Haridi, Towards Greater Gender and Ethnic 
Diversity in International Arbitration, 2 BCDR INT’L ARB. REV. 305, 
314 (2015) (detailing studies of implicit biases and positing that such 
implicit biases against women and minorities exist in international 
arbitration). 
13. Koh, supra note 11, at 738 (“Depending upon one’s opinion of the 
system of unilateral party-appointed arbitrators, the quantitative 
approach [to challenging arbitrator on the basis of repeat appointments] 
can be seen either as an intrusion on the parties’ fundamental right to 
select arbitrators or a small step towards safeguarding the legitimacy of 
arbitration.”). 
14. See generally Mia Louise Livingstone, Party Autonomy in International 
Commercial Arbitration: Popular Fallacy or Proven Fact? 25 J. INT’L 
ARB. 529 (2008) (addressing party-autonomy in international arbitration 
and actually investigating whether this facet of international arbitration 
is still true). 
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However desirable and morally good those efforts to diversify 
tribunals may be, they arguably collide with an attorney’s ethical 
obligation to provide their client the best chance to prevail. No one 
seems to disagree with the premise that, given the choice between an 
arbitrator with a favorable jurisprudence to one’s side and a totally 
unknown newcomer, a competent lawyer will choose the former. But 
every year, more and more voices call for change.15 As explored in the 
next section of this Note, the literature on this subject comes in many 
forms and at a quick pace: presentations are given on the topic, 
articles are written, and “grassroots” efforts are made to diversify the 
practice on a near-monthly basis.  
By examining why individuals believe diverse tribunals positively 
affect international arbitration, we can determine whether the 
continuance of this dispute resolution mechanism is in jeopardy. In 
asking that question, we can also hypothesize whether the call for 
diversity must be answered, and more importantly, how it should be 
answered. The analysis leads to one of the great tensions in the 
diversity debate. On one side is party autonomy and client interests—
international arbitration was founded on the principle that the parties 
control the process. On the other side is the value that diversity can 
bring to international arbitration and the struggle to convince 
practitioners that party autonomy does not have to be subverted in 
the quest for diverse tribunals. Thus, how to answer the diversity 
question is the most important aspect of toeing this line between 
party autonomy and the benefits of diversity.   
Part I of this Note explores the current research trends and 
critiques of arbitral tribunals, and looks at the most recent survey on 
diversity in international arbitration. Parts II and III examine the 
importance of the party-appointed arbitrator as evidenced by the 
history of arbitration and the importance of the arbitrator selection 
process in today’s arbitral proceedings. Part IV focuses on some of the 
primary reasons for which international arbitral tribunals have 
become homogenous. Part V asks to what extent does a lack of 
diversity harm international arbitration, and analyzes three possible 
ways homogeneity affects the quality of the arbitral system. Part VI 
addresses the largest obstacle remaining in the diversity debate: 
changing behavior. Part VII concludes by illustrating how organic 
solutions—like taking into consideration financial incentives—could 
lead to more diverse tribunals in international arbitration.  
 
15. See generally Jonathan Mackojc, 10 Hot Topics for International 
Arbitration in 2017 (Feb. 18, 2017), 
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2017/ 02/18/booked/ 
[https://perma.cc/ARW2-WRC6] (highlighting the arbitrator selection 
process as a “hot topic” for 2017). 
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I.  Arbitral Tribunals are a Perennially Rich Topic 
of Debate and Critique. 
Arbitrators, the selection process of arbitrators, and diversity of 
arbitral tribunals are perennially rich topics in the international 
arbitration community. In February 2017, the Kluwer Arbitration 
Blog published its “10 Hot Topics for International Arbitration in 
2017.”16 Arbitrator Selection Process was number two on the list;17 
Diversity in International Arbitration was number nine.18 Indeed, 
2017 saw a flurry of law publications on the subject, including surveys 
detailing the gender disparities in international arbitration.19 In 
March, Won Kidane published his analysis of cultural diversity in 
international arbitration in his article Does Cultural Diversity 
Improve or Hinder The Quality of Arbitral Justice?20 In the same 
month, Pennsylvania State University, in tandem with the 
International Arbitration Association, hosted the “Contemporary 
Issues & Emerging Trends in International Arbitration” conference.21 
One of the main panel discussions involved women in arbitration and 
the diversity issues related to gender in international arbitration.22  
Later, in Fall 2017, The International Dispute Resolution News, a 
publication of the American Bar Association, published an article 
titled Diversity in International Arbitration: Daring To Open New 
Doors.23 Even up until the very last days of the year, scholars were 





19. See Dr. Markus Altenkirch & Dr. Jan Frohloff, Gender Diversity in 
International Arbitration – Statistics (July 3, 2017), 
https://globalarbitrationnews .com/gender-diversity-in-international-
arbitration-some-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/EK4M-EDY9]. 
20. Won Kidane, Does Cultural Diversity Improve or Hinder The Quality of 




21. João Marçal Martins, Penn Law to Host Forum on Key International 
Arbitration Trends Including Post-Brexit and Trump Era Arbitration, 




23. Shari Manasseh Ohri, Esq., Diversity in International Arbitration: 
Daring to Open New Doors, THE INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
NEWS 7 (Fall 2017). 
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arbitration scholar, ended 2017 with her article The Key to Unlocking 
the Arbitrator Diversity Paradox?: Arbitrator Intelligence, published 
on December 27th.24  
The topic even made it into the 25th Annual Willem C. Vis 
International Commercial Arbitration Moot problem—an 
international arbitration competition with thousands of law school 
participants.25 One part of the mock legal problem dealt with the 
challenging of an arbitrator (Mr. Prasad) over his repeat 
appointments (a topic associated with lack of diversity) by the same 
law firm as well as his ties to a third-party funder in the proceeding.26 
In March 2018, for the oral arguments portion of the competition, 
thousands of law students from around the world met in Vienna and 
Hong Kong and argued about these very real, pressing issues, albeit in 
a completely fictitious environment.27 
But even before 2017, the topic of arbitrator selection—and the 
lack of diversity in international arbitration—was on the radar of 
many scholars and practitioners. In 2015, a group of women 
practitioners in international arbitration launched the website “Equal 
Representation in Arbitration” (“ERA”). 28  The website’s focus is 
“the Pledge:” an agreement to work towards nominating more women 
as arbitrators.29 In its own words, ERA represents that, “The Pledge 
seeks to increase, on an equal opportunity basis, the number of 
women appointed as arbitrators in order to achieve a fair 
representation as soon as practically possible, with the ultimate goal 
of full parity.”30 Currently, 3,414 people have signed the Pledge.31 
 
24. Catherine Rogers, The Key to Unlocking the Arbitrator Diversity 
Paradox?: Arbitrator Intelligence, WOLTERS KLUWER (Dec. 27, 2017), 
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2017/12/27/on-
arbitrators/ [https://perma.cc/V9HF-PZZN]. 
25. The official 25th Vis Moot Problem is available for download at 
https://vismoot.pace.edu/media/site/previous-moots/25th-vis-
moot/25thVisMootFinalPO2.pdf [https://perma.cc/DXX4-EXLA]. On 
the document itself, an arbitrator in the fictitious problem is officially 
challenged on page 38 (Notice of Challenge of Mr. Prasad). 
26. See id.  
27. 25th Annual Willem C. Vis International Commercial Arbitration Moot 
https://vismoot.pace.edu/media/site/previous-moots/25th-vis-
moot/programme.pdf [https://perma.cc/GYA4-EAZQ. 
28. EQUAL REPRESENTATION IN ARBITRATION, 
http://www.arbitrationpledge.com/ [https://perma.cc/ZMJ9-7AUE]. 
29. Id. 
30. Commentary on the Pledge, EQUAL REPRESENTATION IN ARBITRATION, 
http://www.arbitrationpledge.com/about-the-pledge 
[https://perma.cc/Q2BB-CJJT]. 
31. See EQUAL REPRESENTATION IN ARBITRATION, supra note 28. (As of 
January 2019, the Pledge had 3,414 signatories. According to the 
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Apart from the Pledge itself, the website currently serves as a 
resource for numerous gender-diversity initiatives.32  
Similarly, in 2012, Catherine Rogers published her industry-
changing proposal: Arbitrator Intelligence, Inc.—an initiative to 
change the way that lawyers seek information about prospective 
arbitrators.33 Again, in its own terms, “Arbitrator Intelligence aims to 
promote transparency, accountability, and diversity in arbitrator 
appointments.”34  
No doubt, lack of diversity in international arbitration is a hot 
topic. The Kluwer International Arbitration Blog35 could have put it 
on a “hot topic” list for every year for the past decade. While the 
subject matter undeniably dominates the headlines in international 
arbitration, breaking down those articles to concrete numbers shows 
that practitioners themselves recognize the importance of diverse 
tribunals—or at a minimum, believe that arbitral tribunals are not 
diverse.  
 
Pledge’s website, “This number includes both individual signatories 
signing in their own name and organisation signatories to the ERA 
Pledge. While most signatories are listed on this website, some 
individual signatories choose to remain anonymous.”). 
32. Events, EQUAL REPRESENTATION IN ARBITRATION, http://www. 
arbitrationpledge.com/events [https://perma.cc/6UKJ-UZMD. 
33. See Catherine Rogers, The International Arbitrator Information Project: 
An Idea Whose Time Has Come, WOLTERS KLUWER (Aug. 9, 2012), 
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2012/08/09/the-
international-arbitrator-information-project-an-idea-whose-time-has-
come/ [https://perma.cc/8XKG-58FS]. (This blog post served as the 
catalyst to Catherine Rogers’ project—well before she even had a name 
for what would become Arbitrator Intelligence. In her call to action, she 
describes the project as follows: “Perhaps the time has come for an 
International Arbitrator Information Project, a resource to provide 
reliable one-stop-shopping for information about arbitrators. The Project 
would collect and provide instant electronic access to all available and 
relevant awards, publications, judicial opinions, and commentaries about 
individual arbitrators. It would also include a mechanism for providing 
feedback about arbitrators. The challenge will be to solicit reliable and 
useful feedback, and avoid feedback that resembles the gripes that 
disgruntled customers cram into grocery store comment boxes. 
Constructive and reliable information about arbitrators will be sought 
primarily through questions addressing the specific issues that are 
currently pursued through ad hoc inquiries. Judicious editorial policies 
and procedures will provide safeguards against unprofessional postings 
and disclosure of confidential information.”). 
34. The full mission statement of Arbitration Intelligence is available at 
ARBITRATOR INTELLIGENCE, http://www.arbitratorintelligence.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/62VS-5C92]. 
35. Kluwer Arbitration Blog, WOLTERS KLUWER, http://arbitrationblog. 
kluwerarbitration.com/ [https://perma.cc/TMQ5-PXPX.  
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Surveys of practitioners make up a considerable chunk of the 
empirical evidence that speaks to diversity in international 
arbitration. Nearly every year, a new survey comes out that 
corroborates the overwhelmingly used catch phrase to describe 
international arbitral tribunals: male, pale, and stale.36 But this 
description is not as crass as one might think. The truth is that men 
from North America or Western Europe do dominate most arbitral 
tribunals, and most are generally older.37 Practitioners agree. 
In 2017, the law firm Berwin Leighton Paisner  (“BLP”) 
conducted a survey (“BLP Survey”) on diversity in international 
arbitration and polled 122 respondents from all over the globe.38 84% 
of the respondents thought there were too many men in arbitral 
tribunals.39 Furthermore, 80% of respondents thought that tribunals 
contained too many white arbitrators.40 The survey, though, was not 
comprised solely of thoughts or observations—it showed raw data. 
BLP pointed out that from January to November of 2016 at the 
ICC,41 only 20% of arbitrators appointed were women.42 And, even 
though raw numbers on minority appointments are difficult to obtain, 
one statistician found that 45% of arbitral tribunals in ICSID 
proceedings43 from 1972 to May 2015 were composed of all Anglo-
European Arbitrators.44  
 
36. Joseph Mamounas, ICCA 2014. Does “Male, Pale, and Stale” Threaten 
the Legitimacy of International Arbitration? Perhaps, but There’s No 






38. BERWIN LEIGHTON PAISNER, DIVERSITY ON ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS: ARE 
WE GETTING THERE? 7 (2017). 
39. Id. at 10. 
40. Id.  
41. INT’L CHAMBER OF COM., https://iccwbo.org/ [https://perma.cc/HF7J-
N6GY]. The ICC is the International Chamber of Commerce and has its 
headquarters in Paris, France. The ICC is arguably the most recognized 
arbitral institution in the world. 
42. BERWIN LEIGHTON PAISNER, supra note 38, at 4.  
43. INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISP., https://icsid.worldbank. 
org/en/pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/S672-W5KV]. ICSID, or 
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, was 
established 1966 by the Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States. It is “a 
multilateral treaty formulated by the Executive Directors of 
the World Bank to further the Bank’s objective of promoting 
international investment. ICSID is an independent, depoliticized and 
effective dispute-settlement institution. Its availability to investors and 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 51 (2019) 
Sifting Through the Arbitrators 
404 
One might begin to wonder why the arbitrator receives such 
attention. Yes, the arbitrator is ultimately the adjudicator of a 
dispute—and the fact that a party can choose its arbitrator is distinct 
from other forms of dispute resolution.45 But those two reasons alone 
cannot justify the sheer number of people writing on the subject, or 
the resources used to conduct surveys every single year that 
ultimately come to the same conclusion. Better explanations for the 
importance of arbitrator dialogue exist in the history of the arbitrator 
as well as the modern day selection process of one’s arbitrator.  
II.  The Party-Appointed Arbitrator is the 
Cornerstone of International Arbitration from Time 
Immemorial 
The ability to appoint one’s arbitrator exemplifies and defines 
international arbitration.46 The party-appointed arbitrator’s roots 
quite literally reach back to antiquity.47 This should come as no 
surprise: international arbitration itself dates back millennia, with 
some scholars citing to cases that allegedly occurred in the 2000s 
B.C.48 Specifically regarding the role of the arbitrator, orators in both 
the Classical and Hellenistic periods of Ancient Greece reference the 
position of party-appointed arbitrator in speeches.49 Party-appointed 
arbitrators served important roles during the Renaissance, the 
American Civil War, and during the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 
1907.50 In 1907, attendees at the Hague Conference described the 
 
States helps to promote international investment by providing 
confidence in the dispute resolution process. It is also available for state-
state disputes under investment treaties and free trade agreements, and 
as an administrative registry.” About ICSID, INT’L CTR. FOR 
SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISP., https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages 
/about/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/BLQ6-KQTC]. 
44. BERWIN LEIGHTON PAISNER, supra note 38, at 4. 
45. Gary Born, Chapter 12: Selection, Challenge and Replacement of 
Arbitrators in International Arbitration, in, INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1636, 1639 (Kluwer Law International 2d ed. 
2014). 
46. Id. 
47. Sundaresh Menon, Adjudicator, Advocate, or Something in Between? 
Coming to Terms with the Role of the Party-Appointed Arbitrator, 34 J. 
INT’L. ARB. 348, 351-4 (2017). 
48. See Gary Born, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 6, 8 (2014) 
(citing Lafont, L’arbitrage en Mésopotamie, 2000 Rev. arb. 557, 568-78, 
noting, for example, the case of Ur v. Lagash in which the King of Uruk 
ordered a city to return territory seized by force from another).   
49. Id.  
50. Id.  
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opportunity for a party to select its own adjudicator as “a right which 
is the very essence of arbitral justice.”51 The Treaty of Washington—
implemented to settle disputes between Great Britain and the United 
States—formed the basic structure of what is now international 
arbitration, and it, too, depended upon the party-appointed 
arbitrator.52  
Given the arbitrator’s role in history, some have even stated that 
the party-appointed arbitrator is the cornerstone to the very existence 
of arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism.53 Indeed, party 
appointments “were used as a tool to overcome the distrust between 
disputants from diverse cultures. Without the comfort of being able to 
appoint an arbitrator of one’s choosing, it was said that the parties 
could not be brought to the table.”54 History, therefore, accounts for 
one of the reasons why arbitrator selection dominates criticism and 
intrigue.  
Today, the party-appointed arbitrator maintains this important 
position, and selection of the arbitrator is considered to be the single 
most important step in the arbitration process.55 Not only is it of 
fundamental importance that parties and counsel know how to select 
the best arbitrator, but also, “a proper selection process is essential 
for the protection and safeguard of the rights of the parties to the 
arbitration.”56 Identifying the criteria that counsel and parties seek in 
potential arbitrators as well as understanding why these criteria 
matter reinforces the seriousness of the decision, and provides a 
background to why a lack of diversity in international arbitration 
might be problematic. 
III.  The Resources, Time, and Effort Expended in The 
Arbitrator-Selection Process Underscores the 
Importance of the Arbitrator’s Role in International 
Arbitration  
Arbitrator selection has already been compared to the HasbroTM 
family game “Guess Who.”57 The game involves a board that has the 
 
51. Nairac, supra note 6, at 127. 
52. Menon, supra note 47, at 353. 
53. Id. at 354. 
54. Id.  
55. Douglas Earl Mclaren, Party-Appointed vs List-Appointed Arbitrators: 
A Comparison, 20 J. INT’L ARB. 233, 233 (2003). 
56. Carlos Alberto Matheus López, Practical Criteria for Selecting 
International Arbitrators, 31 J. INT’L ARB. 795, 796 (2014). 
57. Paul Baker, Why Picking an Arbitrator is Like Playing Guess WhoTM? 
WOLTERS KLUWER (Sept. 1, 2017), 
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faces of 24 individuals on it.58 A player chooses a character with 
distinguishing physical features (i.e. glasses, a certain hair color, facial 
hair).59 Then, the other players try to guess which character was 
selected by asking questions like “Does this person have hair?” Or, 
“Does this person wear glasses?”60 With each answer, a character is 
eliminated, and the pool of remaining individuals dwindles.61  
In its most basic form, this process is like arbitrator selection. 
Lawyers from both parties begin to “construct” their arbitrator by 
looking for individuals with certain characteristics—objective and 
subjective factors—that all converge to one point, and at that point is 
the arbitrator who meets all of the qualities sought by a party. For 
example, an international arbitration proceeding might involve a 
French contractual dispute. Thus, a lawyer with a list of names of 
prospective arbitrators would ask of each candidate, “Does this 
individual speak French?” Each case has its own intricacies, and the 
character traits sought—as evidenced below—vary from case-to-case. 
Like “Guess Who,” each trait sought eliminates a potential arbitrator 
up until only one man or woman remains. But given the importance 
of the party-appointed arbitrator, and the dueling sides in an 
adjudicative process, arbitrator Guess Who becomes more a chess 
match, with each side trying to gain a leg up by choosing the perfect 
arbitrator.62  
The basic outline of the arbitrator selection process is as follows: 
(1) review the candidate’s professional background; (2) conduct a 
“word of mouth” interview of colleagues and practitioners to ascertain 
personal details about the arbitrator; (3) review previous awards that 
the arbitrator has issued, if possible; (4) analyze any and all articles, 
treaties, or other publications that could possibly shed light on an 
arbitrator’s disposition regarding a certain issue, especially if that 




58. Guess Who Game Rules: How Do You Play Guess Who?, HOW DO YOU 





62. What makes a perfect arbitrator depends on the proceeding. But one of 
the most highly sought qualities is an arbitrator with a favorable 
jurisprudence to one’s side. A perfect arbitrator, in this case, would be 
the arbitrator who will most likely rule in one’s favor. This 
characteristic is a major part of the selection process. See López, supra 
note 56, at 796 (“There is a tendency amongst the parties to seek the 
greatest predictability in the constitution of the arbitral tribunal”). 
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could possibly lead to disqualification of the arbitrator; (6) conduct a 
pre-appointment interview—this is a hot-button issue in the 
international arbitration community in of itself;63 (7) finally, officially 
appoint the arbitrator.64 These steps further break down into two 
subcategories: objective qualities and subjective qualities.65 Striking 
the perfect balance between these two categories is the goal of the 
arbitrator selection process.  
A.  The Typical Objective Qualities sought in the Arbitrator-Selection 
Process 
In general, the objective qualities of the arbitrator selection 
process are a combination of the minimal procedural structure of the 
arbitration—like the number of arbitrators—coupled with the pieces 
of information that professionals routinely share on their CVs or their 
websites: expertise, language abilities, compensation, etc.66 For 
example, the number of arbitrators and language of the arbitration 
proceeding are two fundamental objective qualities.67 Both of these 
factors usually stem from the dispute-resolution clause, or the 
procedural rules chosen by the parties.68 Linguistic skills matter, of 
course, for the proceeding itself.69 But imagine the scenario of a 
dispute that involves a contract written in a particular language—a 
language that might even be different than the language of the 
proceeding itself. Undoubtedly, a party will look for an arbitrator who 
can read and understand the contract that sits at the heart of the 
dispute.  
Expertise of the arbitrator matters, too.70 Does the dispute 
involve technical matters that require an arbitrator with a specific 
skill set? An industry expert, who is also an arbitrator, “fosters 
efficiency, since less time needs to be spent educating [the arbitral 
tribunal] about technical matters. Arbitrators with such expertise can 
 
63. See Kabir Singh and Elan Krishna, Interviewing Prospective 
Arbitrators, WOLTERS KLUWER (Sept. 29, 2015), 
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration. com/2015/09/29/interviewing-
prospective-arbitrators/ [https://perma.cc/KRT5-5V8H] (detailing the 
right and wrong way to conduct a pre-appointment interview).  
64. López, supra note 56, at 802. 
65. Id. at 796-801. 
66. See id. at 796-800 (enumerating the various objective factors used when 
considering an arbitrator). 
67. Id. at 796-7. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 797. 
70. Id. at 798. 
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‘cut through’ the issues.”71 This desire for a technical expert must be 
balanced with the need to have arbitrators that, above all else, 
understand the technicalities of the arbitration proceeding itself. Since 
the integrity of the arbitration proceeding has a potential effect on 
the validity of the award in the face of judicial scrutiny, counsel 
might be inclined to sacrifice this technical expertise for the safer bet 
of an arbitrator who simply follows the rules.72 
The availability of an arbitrator and the standing and influence of 
an arbitrator are two important, interrelated factors.73 Elite and 
prestigious arbitrators are a natural choice for counsel for numerous 
reasons. The elite arbitrator can exercise influence inside the arbitral 
tribunal.74 Furthermore, the decorated arbitrator is less likely to be 
accused of favoritism in the party-appointed system because his or her 
rise to the top of the profession stems from being “just and 
competent” and not partisan or influenced by the party who 
appointed the arbitrator.75 But the difficulty with choosing a top-
name arbitrator is twofold. First, top arbitrators typically have higher 
fees for their services.76 Second, these industry giants are typically 
booked—they are in arbitral proceedings all over the world, and their 
schedules and availability become problematic.77 Some arbitrators are 
full-time arbitrators, while others are practicing attorneys, law 
professors, or government officials.78 Accordingly, trying to sync the 
schedule of the proceeding with the fixed schedule of a professor, or 
with the schedule of an in-demand arbitrator can delay proceedings 
considerably. Imagine the scheduling nightmare if a panel of three 
high-demand arbitrators is constituted. Thus, speed of the 
proceedings becomes a tactical consideration when choosing an 
arbitrator.79  
71. Charles J. Moxley, Jr., Selecting the Ideal Arbitrator, 60 DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION J. 24, 27 (2005). 
72. López, supra note 56, at 798 (explaining that “whether a technician or a 
lawyer is chosen, they must have knowledge of arbitration law, because 
they might incur various errors in procedendo that could result in the 
annulment of the arbitral award. In this sense, the arbitrators will need 
to have experience conducting arbitration proceedings effectively and 
expeditiously”). 
73. Id. at 798-9. 
74. Id. at 799. 
75. Id. at 798. 
76. Id. at 799. 
77. Id. at 798. 
78. Id.  
79. Yu Jin Tay, Reflections on the Selection of Arbitrators in International 
Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THE COMING OF A NEW 
AGE? 112, 128 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2013). 
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These characteristics obviously do not make up all of the 
objective qualities in the selection process. But they form the very 
basic form of the arbitral tribunal and lay the foundation for who will 
serve as the arbitrators. Once this base level is established, then the 
focus turns to the subjective qualities and finding the right arbitrator 
match for one’s case. 
B.  The Subjective Qualities of the Arbitrator-Selection Process and 
How these Characteristics Affect the Proceeding 
Subjective qualities often involve what are known as the “soft 
skills” of an arbitrator80 and address an arbitrator’s individual work 
habits, styles, and propensities. In layman’s terms, it is a personality 
test. Choosing the right personality is pivotal to one’s case. It is 
important to remember that the arbitrator may end up on an arbitral 
tribunal with two other members. Strong personalities—and egos—
matter.81 This potential of competing personalities on the arbitral 
tribunal lead counsel to ask an often-overlooked question: does the 
arbitrator “play well” with others?82 Those with the temperament of a 
“diplomat” tend to be more attractive choices.83 
Subjective qualities manifest themselves with respect to the way 
in which an arbitrator even approaches a case. For example, a major 
subjective quality is the dichotomy of big-picture people versus 
sticklers—”the conceptual, open-minded, equity-oriented person at 
one extreme, and the rule-oriented, no-nonsense, by-the-numbers 
strict constructionist at the other.”84 An offshoot of these 
characteristics is the importance of an arbitrator with strong 
management skills.85 Arbitration’s freedom from the procedural 
constraints of litigation is one of its greatest assets.86 But if this 
freedom is not managed properly, it can lead to delays and increased 
costs in the arbitral process.87 Indeed, parties might actively seek an 
 
80. Ema Vidak-Gojkovic et al., Chapter II: The Arbitrator and the 
Arbitration Procedure, Puppies or Kittens? How to Better Match 
Arbitrators to Party Expectations, in AUSTRIAN YEARBOOK ON 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 61, 64 (Christian Klausegger et al. eds., 
2016). 
81. Tay, supra note 79, at 126. 
82. Vidak-Gojkovic, supra note 80, at 66. 
83. Tay, supra note 79, at 126. 
84. Moxley, supra note 71, at 26. 
85. Jessika Stadwick, Four Factors to Consider When Selecting an 
Arbitrator ALTAMIMI & CO. (June 2013), http://www.tamimi.com/law-
update-articles/four-factors-to-consider-when-selecting-an-arbitrator/ 
[https://perma.cc/9YF8-G7MD].   
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
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arbitrator known for “creative case management” because the case 
demands that type of proceeding.88  
These subjective qualities are important insofar as one has 
concerns regarding the procedural management of the case—and most 
practitioners do have this concern.89 As important as these 
procedural-personality proxies are, far more important are the 
potential landmines that hide from counsel in the field of arbitrators. 
Is the arbitrator that lawyer who was a bully when serving in the 
judiciary and now makes counsel “jump through unnecessary hoops of 
their creation?”90 Some call this personality type “the superjudge.”91 
Or, is the prospective arbitrator the type of person who cannot 
maintain order and lets the arbitral process get out of hand?92 This 
type is called “the wimp.”93 The personality types and potential 
ramifications on the arbitral process are endless.94 
These few questions addressed make up, understandably, just a 
fraction of the game that counsel plays when picking the right 
arbitrator. While some of the information sought is readily 
available—like basic CV information—accurate information speaking 
to the subjective qualities “can be the single most difficult challenge 
when identifying candidates for nomination.”95 The subjective 
qualities are everything that the objective qualities are not—they are 
the unknown bits of information that shed light on an arbitrator’s 
personal personality and legal personality.   
The logical implication of each objective and subjective factor is a 
narrowing of the prospective candidates. Each box checked that meets 
a necessary or desirable quality in a prospective arbitrator eliminates 
a name from the candidate list. And, if one considers how many boxes 
need to be checked, these “required and desirable qualities result in 
 
88. Tay, supra note 79, at 128. 
89. See Vidak-Gojkovic, supra note 80, at 65 (elaborating on a 2010 survey 
in which respondents emphasized these soft skills as important and 
having an impact on the efficiency and cost of a case). 
90. López, supra note 56, at 801. 
91. Id.  
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. See id. (listing other personality types like the egomanic, the 
superlawyer, the White Knight, and the unemployed opportunist and 
giving a breakdown of how they affect the arbitral tribunal). 
95. Vidak-Gojkovic, supra note 80, at 64. 
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the selection of a small group of highly talented international 
arbitrators.”96  
A dilemma exists—or at least a contradiction on this point. Since 
the ideal arbitrator always depends on the particular case,97 and each 
case theoretically has its own ins and outs—its own boxes that need 
to be checked—diverse tribunals should be the norm rather than the 
exception. To have the same people adjudicating the same claims 
would imply that cases are so similar, every time, that counsel chose 
the same arbitrators because their specific qualities mandate that 
arbitrator choice. We know this to be false, though. The easiest way 
to show it is false is the fact that the same arbitrators have sat on 
investment treaty tribunals as well as commercial arbitration 
tribunals.98  
People refer to this group of select individuals as the “pool” of 
arbitrators.99 The constant critique is that the pool of arbitrators is 
too small, and increasing the pool of arbitrators is a necessary first 
step to diversifying arbitral tribunals.100 But the diversity issue is not 
that simple. Throwing names into this pool will not solve the problem 
without also considering the other major systemic factors in 
international arbitration that stifle tribunal diversity.   
 
96. Chiara Giorgetti, The Arbitral Tribunal: Selection and Replacement of 
Arbitrators, in LITIGATING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES: A 
PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 143, 156 (2014). 
97. Moxley, supra note 71, at 25. 
98. International arbitration is primarily broken down into two distinct 
categories: international commercial arbitration and investment-treaty 
arbitration. The former is usually a contract dispute between two 
international companies who have agreed to submit their disputes to 
arbitration. The latter refers to arbitration proceedings between a 
claimant investor of one state and a respondent government of another 
state, in whose jurisdiction the investor claims to have made an 
investment that is the subject of a dispute. This system allows for 
individuals to bring arbitration proceedings against countries in their 
sovereign capacities. While both of these forms of arbitration share 
similarities, their differences are tremendous. For an in-depth look at 
investor-state arbitration and its history, see Andrew Newcombe Lluís 
Paradell, Chapter 1 - Historical Development of Investment Treaty Law, 
in LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES: STANDARDS OF 
TREATMENT 1 (Andrew Newcombe & Lluís Paradell eds., Jan. 2009). 
99. Jacomijn J. van Haerolte-Van Hof, Diversity in Diversity, in 18 
LEGITIMACY: MYTHS, REALITIES, CHALLENGES 638, 638-39 (Albert Jan 
van den Berg ed., 2015). 
100. Id. 
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IV. The Other Contributing Factors to Non-Diverse 
Tribunals That Further Complicate Diversity 
Efforts. 
Several reasons exist for the overall lack of diversity in 
international arbitration beyond the small pool of arbitrator thinking. 
Many acknowledge the notion of the “old boys club,”101 and 
furthermore, “the tendency of outside counsel to appoint arbitrators 
who are similar to them”102 as leading reasons for a lack of diversity. 
Implicit bias, some argue, has led to the cycle of women and ethnic 
candidates’ exclusion from arbitral tribunals.103 
The old boys club and an individual’s biases, though, concern 
themselves more with the individual and not the system as a whole. 
To indict the entire institution of arbitration based upon the biases 
and potential discriminatory behavior of a select few is simply unfair 
and prejudicial to all practitioners.104 Whether pure discrimination 
plays a role in the diversity struggle remains unknown, mainly 
because people do not openly flaunt their discrimination. Instead, 
certain aspects of the international arbitration system itself thwart 
tribunal diversity. For example, an overall lack of transparency in the 
actual arbitrator selection process is a systemic flaw in the institution 
that prevents new faces from joining arbitral tribunals.  
A.  Lack of Transparency: The Problem and Proposed Solutions to help 
Diversify Tribunals. 
Despite living in an age when technology permits us to access 
information on almost any subject, the fact remains that the primary 
method by which parties research and choose an arbitrator is by word 
of mouth105—an old-fashioned phone call to a friend or colleague. Why 
is this the case? Part of the issue, which just happens to be one of 
 
101. Thomas J. Stipanowich, A Recent Survey of Experienced U.S. 
Arbitrators Highlights Areas For Further International Study and 




102. Haridi, supra note 12, at 314. 
103. Id. 
104. See Koh, supra note 13, at 713 (arguing that allowing the potential 
biases and actions of a few should not implicate the entire arbitration 
process). 
105. Mauro Rubino-Sammartano, A Second (Quasi-Perfect?) Storm Also in 
Arbitration? 34 J. INT’L ARB. 925, 927 (2017). 
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arbitration’s biggest perks, is the privacy of it all.106 Arbitral awards 
are not typically public information, and when they are made public, 
the arbitrators’ names are removed.107 Thus, while parties can 
typically find general biographical information about arbitrators with 
ease, they struggle to find the information they truly desire—those 
soft, subjective qualities sought in the selection process—like the 
prospective arbitrator’s efficiency, work ethic, and handling of 
discovery.108 Therefore, the only way that counsel can access this 
coveted information is by contacting the party or parties who have 
routinely or recently worked with the prospective arbitrator—the 
word-of-mouth system.   
But this word-of-mouth system ultimately “creates an information 
bottleneck.”109 The result? “The limited number of individuals who 
can provide such information stifles the ability of newer and more 
diverse arbitrators to develop international reputations that . . . are 
key to getting appointments.”110 Another major issue with the word-
of-mouth method of gaining information about potential arbitrators is 
the subjective nature of it. Person-to-person research “largely confines 
assessment of potential arbitrators to subjective evaluation by a 
limited number of individuals.”111 Subjective evaluation becomes more 
“telephonic lottery” and less of a systematic evaluation system.112 And 
discrimination materializes more often in a subjective evaluation as 
opposed to a systematic one.113 The result here? Male, pale, and stale.  
What compounds the situation even more is the relationship 
between the person giving the information about a prospective 
arbitrator and the person asking for the information. The extent to 
which one feels comfortable to divulge information in response to an 
ad hoc, personal inquiry about an arbitrator depends, in large part, on 
the relationship between the information seeker and the information 
divulger.114 Colleagues or close friends will speak more candidly about 
 
106. Gary Born, Chapter 1: Overview of International Commercial 
Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 89 (Kluwer 
Law International 2d ed., 2014). 
107. Catherine Rogers, Chapter II: The Arbitrator and the Arbitration 
Procedure, Transparency in the Arbitrator Selection, in AUSTRIAN 
YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 79 (Christian Klausegger et 
al. eds. 2016). 
108. Id. 
109. Rogers, supra note 24. 
110. Id. 
111. Id.  
112. Id.  
113. Id.  
114. Rogers, supra note 107, at 79-80. 
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a prospective arbitrator than two parties who do not share the same 
familiarity.115 Therefore, two people asking the same person about the 
same arbitrator could receive different accounts of the prospective 
arbitrator—not necessarily conflicting information, but information 
that differs with respect to the “complete view” of the arbitrator.116 
This lack of a complete view frightens the attorney seeking a strong, 
reliable arbitrator.117 Faced with an incomplete view of a prospective 
arbitrator, counsel has almost no choice but to revert to a well-
established name in the industry to avoid any risk of one of those 
landmine arbitrators that affects the entirety of the proceeding.118 
While this current lack of transparency has a direct effect on the 
composition of an arbitral tribunal, and continues the lack of diversity 
in arbitral tribunals, it also fundamentally hinders a new lawyer 
involved in international arbitration, or a lawyer who will participate 
in one international arbitration proceeding in her entire career—the so 
called “one-shot player.”119 The lawyer is either a repeat player or a 
one-shotter.120 It is the “repeat players” who “shape the development 
of law rather than the ‘one-shotters.’”121 Indeed, “the ‘one-shotter’ is 
the player that does not have the advantage of ‘(1) advance 
intelligence...(2) expertise and ready access to specialists...(3) 
opportunities to develop facilitative informal relations with 
institutional incumbents...[or] (4) interest in his ‘bargaining 
reputation’....’”122 This dichotomy epitomizes the result of the lack of 
transparency in the arbitrator selection process. If the selection of the 
arbitrator is the most important decision made by counsel in 
international arbitration, then “it would seem reasonable to assume 
that there is likely no greater ‘repeat player’ advantage—or ‘one-
shotter’ disadvantage—than at the time of arbitrator appointment.”123  
115. Id.  
116. Id. 
117. See generally Daniel Schimmel et al., Transparency in Arbitration, 
THOMPSON REUTERS 2 (2018) (discussing how transparency removes 
some of the concern regarding arbitration and the lack of information 




119. Chiann Bao, Chapter 2: One Shot Players and Arbitrator Selection: A 
Fair Shot or a Shot in the Dark? in THE POWER AND DUTIES OF AN 
ARBITRATOR 10. (Patricia Shaughnessy & Sherlin Tung eds., 2017). 
120. Id. 
121. Id. (quoting Marc Galanter’s article Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead: 
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. AND SOC. R. 1 (1974)). 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 12. 
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The implications of this perceived (and possibly real) advantage is 
the following logical thought process: Repeat players have an 
information advantage over one-shotters with respect to the arbitrator 
selection process—mainly the advantage of having the coveted 
information about an arbitrator. If we assume that these repeat 
players constitute a relatively small number of firms,124 then these 
firms are likely to receive a disproportionate number of appointments 
in relation to the entire international arbitration field.125 The belief is 
that this disproportionate number of appointments makes these 
repeat players “gatekeepers” to the arbitral process.126 And most 
importantly, this division between repeat players and one-shotters 
may also reduce the volume and diversity of the arbitrator pool.127  
These observations of the system, though, are not from an 
outsider’s perspective. In 2015, the Queen Mary-White & Case Survey 
polled international arbitration practitioners about improvements that 
respondents would like to see in the international arbitration 
practice.128 The overwhelming response was a call for institutions to 
“provide more information about arbitrator performance and increase 
transparency about institutional decision making in relation to 
arbitrator appointments and challenges.”129 Interestingly, arbitral 
institutions realized that providing this information led to increased 
use of that same institution.130 Therefore, a major incentive to attract 
counsel and parties to use that institution was precisely to open this 
vault of information that counsel typically sought by the word-of-
 
124. No assumption is really needed because resources like the Global 
Arbitration Review’s “Top 30” corroborate that a small amount of law 
firms receive the most amount of cases. The Global Arbitration Review 
is a subscription-based website whose paywall prevents easy access to 
some of their resources See, Richard Wooley, GAR 30 Revealed, GLOBAL 
ARBITRATION REVIEW, Feb. 26, 2015. But for those who cannot access 
the website, a basic look at the GAR’s methodology can be found at 
Best International Arbitration Law Firms and Practice Groups 
Worldwide: 2018 Rankings, ACERIS LAW (Oct. 17, 2018) 
https://www.acerislaw.com/best-international-arbitration-law-firms/ 
[https://perma.cc/K37R-49YX]. Finally, a copy of the 2017 PDF 




125. Bao, supra note 119, at 13. 
126. Id.  
127. Id.  
128. Rogers supra note 107, at 76. 
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mouth-system.131 As a business decision, it is an unequivocal win: an 
arbitral tribunal’s reputation improves by this commitment to 
transparency and, in so doing, attracts more business—i.e. parties and 
counsel choose that institution and pay that institution for its 
services. Calling for transparency in the arbitrator selection process 
was once “akin to threatening to raze the gates of Rome and sack its 
inhabitants.”132 Now, transparency of some sort is the norm for some 
arbitral institutions.133  
B.  The Best Chance to Succeed Conundrum Requires Counsel to Put 
the Client’s Interests Above Diversity Initiatives. 
Another major factor that contributes to the lack of diversity in 
tribunals is “the best chance to succeed” conundrum.134 The 
international arbitration community is highly sensitive to perceptions 
of its own legitimacy.135 The observations detailed up until this point 
constitute more of the negative beliefs of how the same names 
continue to dominate arbitral tribunals, and why there exists a lack of 
diversity in international arbitration. Accordingly, “indictments” like 
those addressed in this Note “should be taken seriously and be refuted 
 
131. Id. at 79. 
132. Id. at 75. 
133. Some of the leading institutions have made serious commitments to 
transparency. The ICC now mandates a prospective arbitrator to 
disclose the number of arbitrations in which he or she is currently acting 
as well as that arbitrator’s availability going forward. See generally, 
Note to Parties and Arbitral Tribunals on the Conduct of the 
Arbitration under the ICC Rules of Arbitration, INTERNATIONAL 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, Sept. 2016 (mandating prospective arbitrators 
to disclose the number of arbitrations in which he or she is currently 
acting as well as that arbitrator’s availability going forward). The 
Commercial Arbitration Centre of Lisbon – Portugal has implemented 
“Criteria for the appointment of arbitrators by the Centre approved by 
the Board of the Arbitration Centre of the Portuguese Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry.” The essence of these guidelines is to regulate, 
increase party input, and make the overall arbitrator selection process 
more transparent. In a different manner, the Hong Kong International 
Arbitration Court (HKIAC) now uses feedback forms to evaluate the 
institution’s performance as well as the arbitral tribunal’s management 
of a case. For more information regarding these efforts as well as others 
not listed, see Rogers supra note 107, at 78.  
134. See Nieuwveld, supra note 2 (referring to this conundrum as choosing 
between the “weathered veteran” or the “young buck”); see also, 
Rogers, supra note 25 (describing the conundrum as the “diversity 
paradox” wherein counsel wants to provide the best chance to succeed 
while also trying to help diversify tribunals). 
135. Catherine Rogers, The Arrival of the “Have-Nots” in International 
Arbitration 8 NEV. L. J. 341, 377 (2007).  
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where possible.”136 To leave these accusations unaddressed might “cast 
a pall over the legitimacy of international arbitration and allow 
baseless suspicions to fester.”137 Therefore, while some see invidious 
discrimination and systemic shortcomings as a reason for a lack of 
diversity in international arbitration, another group of individuals 
explain the lack of diversity as a mere consequence of counsel’s ethical 
obligation to give a client the best chance to succeed.138 
Just as a client wants to choose “the best” law firm or attorney, 
so, too, does the client (through counsel’s recommendation) wish to 
have the “best” arbitrator. Obviously “best” has different meanings. 
It can mean the arbitrator most likely to rule in one’s favor, or simply 
an arbitrator with substantial experience.139 That “big-name” 
arbitrator is easy to choose then, because counsel “can feel confident 
that [the arbitrator] could likely quote every important book written 
on the subject matter which may greatly influence the outcome of 
[the] arbitral proceedings.”140 This “best arbitrator available” view is 
best illustrated by the response of an anonymous commentator to a 
survey on international arbitration who stated, “When asked by a 
client to select an arbitrator, the desirability of promoting diversity is 
the last feature on anyone’s mind. ‘We are not being asked to make a 
statement’ he said, ‘we are asked to pick the best person for the 
job.’”141 
The BLP Survey142from Section III of this Note also touched upon 
this “best arbitrator” theme. Corroborating the anonymous 
commentator’s views, 93% of respondents felt that a prospective 
arbitrator’s expertise was either “very important” or “important” 
whereas only 54% felt that it was desirable to have a “diverse” 
 
136. Koh, supra note 13, at 713. 
137. Id. 
138. See generally id. (justifying the tendency for repeat appointments to 
ensure a better result for clients). 
139. See, e.g., Daniel Girsberger & Nathalie Voser, Chapter 3: The Arbitral 
Tribunal, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: COMPARATIVE AND SWISS 
PERSPECTIVES 158 (3d ed., 2016) (discussing how experience of the 
arbitrator is tantamount in some instances); see also, e.g., William W. 
Park, Part III Chapter 9: Arbitrator Integrity, in THE BACKLASH 
AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 203 (Michael Waibel et al. eds., 
2010) (“Party participation in the constitution of a tribunal means that 
each side will want to be sure that its nominee (and the presiding 
arbitrator if possible) will be free of doctrinal predispositions that would 
adversely affect its case”).  
140. Nieuwveld, supra note 2. 
141. Lucy Greenwood & C. Mark Baker, Getting a Better Balance on 
International Arbitration Tribunals 28 J. OF THE LONDON COURT OF 
INT’L ARB. 653, 661 n.42 (2012). 
142. BERWIN LEIGHTON PAISNER, supra note 38. 
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tribunal.143 Curiously, when asked how important gender and 
ethnicity were when choosing an arbitrator, 52% of respondents noted 
“not important at all” for the former, and 30% noted “not important 
at all” for the latter.144 Nothing nefarious exists in this mindset.145 
Indeed, “[a]ppointing parties cannot reasonably be expected to 
appoint arbitrators they are unfamiliar with or do not trust.”146 A 
lawyer’s ethical obligation to provide her client with the best chance 
possible to prevail, therefore, practically requires the lawyer to search 
for that repeat player—that arbitrator who has such an extensive 
body of work (writings, awards, interviews, etc.) that counsel can, 
with some certainty, guess how that arbitrator will rule.147 With high 
stakes, and the possibility of an arbitral award making the whole 
proceeding a zero sum game, any temptation to choose that “dark 
horse” candidate in the name of promoting diversity disappears.  
For the lawyer wishing to make a change in the system, this 
situation presents the ultimate diversity paradox.148 How can we 
further diversity initiatives while still honoring the ethical obligation 
to give clients the best chance to succeed? As Catherine Rogers notes, 
“The key to resolving this paradox is to close the gap between the 
altruism that animates abstract concerns about diversity, and the 
strategic pragmatism that dominates arbitrator selection in individual 
cases.”149 But all of the surveys, the writings, and the calls for 
diversity rest on some assumption that the lack of diversity in 
international arbitration negatively impacts the practice.150 Since some 
proponents go so far as to say that the continued existence of 
 
143. Id. at 9.  
144. Id. at 8. 
145. Haridi, supra note 13, at 315 (“. . . counsel’s duty is to appoint an 
arbitrator in the best interest of the client, not necessarily in the best 
interests of diversity. Appointing an unqualified arbitrator simply 
because he or she is diverse would be ethically deficient. However, 
similarly appointing an unqualified arbitrator simply because he is a 
white male of a certain age would also be ethically deficient). 
146. Koh, supra note 13, at 735. 
147. See Rogers, supra note 107, at 82 (explaining how arbitral awards can 
be used to investigate arbitrator’s decision-making practices). 
148. Rogers, supra note 24. 
149. Id.  
150. Patricia Živković, Diversity in International Arbitration: Where Do We 
Stand? An Overview of a Berwin Leighton Paisner Survey, WOLTERS 
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international arbitration depends upon diversifying tribunals,151 
ascertaining the extent of the problem—if one even exists—is pivotal 
to address such claims. Even generally speaking, it is impossible to 
address the diversity problem without first understanding why it is an 
issue.  
V. All of the Criticism about Diversity Assumes that 
there is Poison in the Well. But is there?  
A lack of diversity in arbitral tribunals is just one of the many 
concerns that involve arbitrators. The arbitral tribunal is a lightning 
rod for attention and controversy. One of the most egregious abuses 
of the system occurred in 2009 after the Republic of Croatia and the 
Republic of Slovenia concluded a treaty to settle land and maritime 
disputes by arbitration.152 In the ensuing arbitration, Slovenia and 
Croatia each appointed their own arbitrator.153 Three more 
distinguished members joined the two party-appointed arbitrators, 
resulting in a five-member tribunal.154 About five months before the 
expected award, a Croatian daily newspaper published transcripts and 
audio recordings of conversations between the Slovenian arbitrator 
and the Slovenian agent.155 The revelations demonstrated arguably 
the worst abuse of the party-appointed arbitrator process: the agent 
and arbitrator colluded over how best to sway the Tribunal to rule in 
favor of Slovenia.156  
Luckily, behavior like this is not common in international 
arbitration.157 Indeed, bribery or manipulation of a judicial figure is 
not limited only to international arbitrators.158 Ridding these 
institutions of corruption and bribery—or some other serious flaw—
should be the goal of the international community. The push for 
diversity in international arbitration assumes that non-diverse 
 
151. van Haersolte-Van Hof, supra note 99, at 648.  
152. Menon, supra note 47, at 348-50 (explaining in much more detail the 
disaster that followed the revelations). 
153. Id. at 349.  
154. Id.  
155. Id.  
156. Id.   
157. Id. at 350. 
158. See Jennifer Steinhauer, Senate, for Just the 8th Time, Votes to Oust a 
Federal Judge, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2010/12/09/us/politics/09judge.html [https://perma.cc/U8SP-DTAA] 
(detailing the impeachment of Judge G. Thomas Porteous Jr., a federal 
judge, for accepting bribes and making statements under penalty of 
perjury). 
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tribunals are problematic in this fashion.159 Nothing of the same 
gravity of the Slovenia-Croatia debacle is directly attributable to the 
lack of diversity in international arbitration, though.160 But several 
other issues do require us to ask if a lack of diversity is a fundamental 
flaw that jeopardizes the future of international arbitration as a global 
dispute resolution mechanism. This section looks at three main issues 
that directly stem from having the same people adjudicate the same 
claims across the world: repeat appointments and the appearance of 
bias; moral justifications for diversity; and cultural differences and the 
relation to fact-finding. 
A.  Repeat Appointments and the Appearance of Bias is a Potential 
Problem that can be connected to a Lack of Diversity.161 
Repeat appointments are a source of tension in international 
arbitration, and the diversity issue attached to repeat appointments 
exacerbates the criticisms.162 The party-appointed arbitrator and the 
current system are ripe for controversy and corruption.163 Seeing the 
same names appointed by the same law firms can lead a reasonable 
person to imagine a quid pro quo system is in place.164 This system 
appears to create an inevitable tension. Arbitrators earn substantial 
fees for their professional services.165 Accordingly, “there is . . . a 
 
159. See, e.g., Darius J. Khambata, Tensions Between Party Autonomy and 
Diversity, in LEGITIMACY: MYTHS, REALITIES, CHALLENGES 620 (Albert 
Jan van den Berg ed., 2015) (representing the common reasons given for 
diversity, none of which rise to a level of severity as expressed in the 
Slovenia v. Croatia debacle).  
160. Id. 
161. For this section, the diversity issue is not traditional diversity (minority 
and gender representation), but instead it is the consequence of the 
small pool of arbitrator concept—seeing the same people adjudicate 
proceedings across the world. 
162. See e.g., Natalia Giraldo-Carrillo, The ‘Repeat Arbitrators’ Issue: A 
Subjective Concept, 19 INT. LAW: REV. COLOMB. DERECHO INT. 75-106 
(2011) (discussing the issues related to repeated appointments of 
arbitrators in conjunction with diversity of panels). 
163. See Seth H. Lieberman, Something’s Rotten in the State of Party-
Appointed Arbitration: Healing ADR’s Black Eye that is “Non-Neutral 
Neutrals,” 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 215 (2004) (describing the 
controversial nature of party-appointed arbitrators and their potential 
corruptive nature). 
164. Smit, supra note 4 (“Once selected, an arbitrator’s personal incentive is 
to secure reemployment by providing his or her party with a favorable 
outcome”). 
165. See generally Gary Born, Chapter 13: Rights and Duties of International 
Arbitrators, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2d ed., 
2014) (explaining in detail the arbitrator’s fees and how those fees are 
calculated across various rules and laws).  
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financial incentive to promote one’s attractiveness as a prospective 
appointee which could, in the eyes of the appointing party, turn on 
the likely outcome of the cases for which they are appointed.”166 
Undoubtedly, this system contradicts the notion that adjudicators 
should have no interest—especially a pecuniary one—in the outcome 
of a case.167 Therefore, one of the thoughts about the party-appointed 
arbitrator is that the appointment of the arbitrator translates into an 
automatic vote for the party who appointed him or her.168 Hence, 
some parties feel that if their arbitrator joins in an award in favor of 
the other side, that arbitrator is a traitor to the cause.169  
Imagine, then, seeing the same law firm appoint the same 
arbitrator, and prevail more often than not when that arbitrator is on 
the tribunal. Is this coincidence or bias? Were the awards unanimous? 
Did the arbitrator grant provisional measures that helped her 
appointing party?170 It is not difficult to understand that the optics of 
repeat appointments invite these questions of bias or prejudice. They 
“put a cloud on due process” and create issues of legitimacy in the 
eyes of insiders and outsiders.171 If tribunals are dominated by older, 
white males from Western cultures, and these same men are 
appointed as arbitrators by the same client or law firm year in and 
year out, international arbitration looks like it lives up to its 
reputation as an “old boys network.”172  
Given the international arbitration community’s sensitivities to 
the outside world’s perception of its inner-workings,173 repeat 
appointments became an issue that needed immediate attention. 
Accordingly, in 2004, the International Bar Association published the 
IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration,174 
 
166. Menon, supra note 47, at 356. 
167. Id. 
168. Herman Duarte, Unilateral Appointments in International Commercial 
Arbitration. Is it time to Change the Way Arbitral Tribunals are 
Constituted?, LAW IN SOCIETY, 101 (2013). 
169. Mclaren, supra note 55, at 235. 
170. These are the types of questions that are asked when an arbitrator is 
challenged on the basis of repeat appointments. See Tidewater Inc., v. 
The Bolivarian Rep. of Venezuela, Int’l Centre for Settlement of Inv. 
Disp., No. ARB/10/5 (2010) (submitting questions similar to the 
aforementioned). 
171. Nairac, supra note 6, at 141. 
172. Id. at 140. 
173. Rogers, supra note 134. 
174. See IBA Guidelines, supra note 10. 
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which deals directly with repeat appointments and other conflicts of 
interest in international arbitration.175  
The Guidelines are split into four lists—the non-waivable red list, 
the waivable red list, the orange list, and the green list. 176 Each list 
contains mini fact-patterns of examples of conflicts of interest whose 
severity—or need for disclosure—varies depending upon which colored 
list contains the conflict of interest.177 Article 3.1.3. on the Orange 
List contains one of the more controversial attempts to curb repeat 
appointments: “The arbitrator has, within the past three years, been 
appointed as arbitrator on two or more occasions by one of the 
parties, or an affiliate of one of the parties.”178 Here, the IBA 
Guidelines are taking issue with the same company or country 
appointing the same arbitrator year in and year out. Article 3.3.8 is 
written in the same style, targeting repeat appointments with respect 
to the lawyer and law firms in general.179 Thus, the law firm that taps 
the same arbitrator every year for a new proceeding will have 
difficulties complying with this guideline. At some point, counsel will 
 
175. Id. 
176. See id. at 17-25 (“The Non-Waivable Red List includes situations 
deriving from the overriding principle that no person can be his or her 
own judge. Therefore, acceptance of such a situation cannot cure the 
conflict. The Waivable Red List covers situations that are serious but 
not as severe. Because of their seriousness, unlike circumstances 
described in the Orange List, these situations should be considered 
waivable, but only if and when the parties, being aware of the conflict of 
interest situation, expressly state their willingness to have such a person 
act as arbitrator, as set forth in General Standard 4(c). The Orange List 
is a non-exhaustive list of specific situations that, depending on the facts 
of a given case, may, in the eyes of the parties, give rise to doubts as to 
the arbitrator’s impartiality or independence. The Orange List thus 
reflects situations that would fall under General Standard 3(a), with the 
consequence that the arbitrator has a duty to disclose such situations. In 
all these situations, the parties are deemed to have accepted the 
arbitrator if, after disclosure, no timely objection is made, as established 
in General Standard 4(a). Finally, [t[he Green List is a non-exhaustive 
list of specific situations where no appearance and no actual conflict of 
interest exists from an objective point of view.” Thus, the arbitrator has 
no duty to disclose situations falling within the Green List. As stated in 
the Explanation to General Standard 3(a), there should be a limit to 
disclosure, based on reasonableness; in some situations, an objective test 
should prevail over the purely subjective test of ‘the eyes’ of the 
parties.). 
177. Id. 
178. Id. at 22. 
179. See id. at 24 (“The arbitrator has, within the past three years, been 
appointed on more than three occasions by the same counsel, or the 
same law firm”). 
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run out of “the usual suspects” and resort to a fresh face—a new 
arbitrator never before appointed by that law firm.180  
Much of the other Guidelines that target repeat appointments 
work in this same fashion.181 But two main criticisms arise with the 
Guidelines in their application to repeat appointments: the fact that 
the Guidelines are simply guidelines, and the quantitative approach 
the Guidelines take. By the drafters’ own admissions, the Guidelines 
“are not legal provisions and do not override any applicable national 
law or arbitral rules chosen by the parties.”182 They are mere 
guidelines that “reflect the understanding of the IBA Arbitration 
Committee as to the best current international practice.”183 Despite 
this possible roadblock, the Guidelines have almost universal 
acceptance in international arbitration.184 Between 2004 and 2009, the 
ICC found that out of 187 arbitrator challenges, 106 of those reference 
an article of the IBA Guidelines.185 
Yet, the successes of the IBA Guidelines lead some to question its 
quantitative approach.186 Arguing for a qualitative approach to repeat 
appointments, one scholar succinctly sums up why the plug-and-
disqualify approach of Article 3.1.3 fails: “Repeat appointments could 
be a result of an arbitrator’s independence and impartiality” and not 
a sign of impropriety.187 Similarly, the number of appointments simply 
says nothing about the a true conflict of interest:  
“By presuming dependence based on absolute numbers removed 
from context, the quantitative approach displaces the proper 
approach of assessing the significance (if any) of the repeat 
appointments against the wider factual backdrop. Any practical 
advantages of such a quantitative approach in terms of 
 
180. An active international arbitration law firm might easily be involved in 
10+ proceedings in a span of three years. Arbitrator selection becomes a 
game of numbers and timing for appointing the right arbitrator. Counsel 
might find themselves in a position where all of their preferred 
arbitrators have been appointed by that same law firm numerous times 
in the previous three years. This situation would run afoul of Guideline 
3.3.8, and require the law firm to pick an arbitrator never before 
appointed by that law firm.   
181. See IBA Guidelines, supra note 10, at 20 (“The arbitrator has given 
legal advice, or provided an expert opinion, on the dispute to a party or 
an affiliate of one of the parties.”). 
182. IBA Guidelines, supra note 10, at 3.   
183. Id. at 2. 
184. Moses, supra note 11. 
185. Id. 
186. For a discussion, see generally Koh, note 13, at 729-39. 
187. Id. at 718-19. 
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certainty are illusory because most would agree that uncertain 
justice is still better than certain injustice.”188 
This response to the Guidelines illustrates the sensitivity 
surrounding any attempts to regulate the arbitrator selection process. 
Furthermore, “the [IBA Guidelines’] approach can be seen either as 
an intrusion on the parties’ fundamental right to select arbitrators or 
a small step towards safeguarding the legitimacy of arbitration.”189 
Whatever side of this spectrum one believes, the fact remains that 
the IBA Guidelines represent a real attempt to combat one aspect of 
the diversity issue in international arbitration—the phenomenon of 
seeing the same arbitrators in a majority of the proceedings. The IBA 
Guidelines help ensure, as realistically as possible, that the arbitral 
proceeding is not damaged or influenced by repeat appointments or 
similar conflicts of interest that lead critics of international 
arbitration to imagine quid-pro-quo agreements between an arbitrator 
and her appointing party.190 They serve as a check on the system, and 
actively combat possible negative effects of non-diverse tribunals. 
Therefore, critics’ concerns that a lack of new arbitrators has a 
negative effect on arbitration have been addressed, and continue to be 
a work in progress. If there were a so-called “poison in the well” 
because of repeat appointments, the arbitral community has met this 
concern with initiatives like the IBA Guidelines. But a larger calling 
for traditional diversity continues to dominate the practice area. 
While diversity in the repeat appointments context is a concern, the 
lack of minorities or equal gender representation, to some, also has a 
substantial effect on the quality of arbitral proceedings.  
B. The Moral Argument for Diversity Lacks Tangibility and Feels Too 
Much Like a Direct Infringement on Party-Autonomy.  
In June 2015, the Director General of the London Court of 
International Arbitration, Jacomijn J. van Haersolte-Van Hof, 
published her article Diversity in Diversity.191 With respect to why 
diversity is potentially relevant, van Haersolte-Van Hof notes, 
“[D]iversity and inclusion are commendable because they ensure a 
better product, in this case a better arbitration process resulting in 
better arbitration awards.”192 Quoting an ABA Report, she concludes  
188. Id. at 734.  
189. Id. at 738.  
190. See Jeffrey Waincymer, Part II: The Process of an Arbitration, Chapter 
5: Selection, Challenge and Change of Arbitrators, in PROCEDURE AND 
EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 298-299 (Jan. 2012) 
(detailing in part the IBA Guidelines’ approach to major financial 
conflicts of interest with respect to arbitrator appointments).   
191. van Haerolte-Van Hof, supra note 99. 
192. Id. at 641. 
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that, “[A] diverse legal profession is more just, productive, and 
intelligent because diversity, both cognitive and cultural, often leads 
to better questions, analyses, solutions, and processes.”193  
This idea that diversity yields better results appears in numerous 
publications about the subject.194 Most scholars and writers that 
maintain this view referenced in a Harvard Business Review195 study, 
which concluded that diverse teams are smarter.196 Other studies 
about the effects of diversity in general yield similar results: diverse 
teams have increased creativity and productivity, and produce wholly 
better products.197 So important is diversity, that proponents even 
state that “diversity on the tribunal is crucial to sustain arbitration as 
a modern, flexible, and desirable method of dispute resolution.”198 
From this author’s perspective, the intangibility of these 
justifications for diversity initiatives prevents proponents from 
convincing skeptics or even neutral persons that a lack of diversity is 
detrimental to international arbitration. Part of the problem is the 
amorphous concept that diversity automatically yields a better 
product. Notwithstanding the intangibility of the term “better 
product,” proponents that advocate this way gloss over the reality 
that, in the throes of any adversarial system, parties simply do not 
care about a “good product”—they just want to win.199 No matter 
how well written a judicial opinion or arbitral award, the losing party 
will probably not find solace in a “good product.”200  
Perhaps what these critics mean is that a diverse tribunal will be 
more likely than not to decide cases correctly. But even this 
contention rests on weak reasoning. Unless one’s case is so black and 
white that only a fool would mess up the result, most issues that 
make it all the way to hearings on the merits can go for the claimant 
or the respondent. To make matters worse for this line of reasoning—
 
193. Id. at 642.   
194. See, e.g., David Rock & Heidi Grant, Why Diverse Teams are 
Smarter, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 4, 2016) https://hbr.org/2016/11/why-
diverse-teams-are-smarter [https://perma.cc/9GQG-KKHF] (discussing 
the importance of diversity for a better workplace). 
195. Id. 
196. Rogers, supra note 24; Haridi, supra note 12. 
197. Haridi, supra note 12, at 310.   
198. Id. at 307.  
199. Rogers, supra note 24. 
200. As the tennis great Andre Agassi once reflected, “Now that I’ve won a 
slam, I know something very few people on earth are permitted to know. 
A win doesn’t feel as good as a loss feels bad, and the good feeling 
doesn’t last long as the bad. Not even close.” ANDRE AGASSI, OPEN 167 
(1st eds., 2009). 
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that diversity yields better results—international arbitration does not 
conform to any real system of stare decisis.201 Accordingly, it is 
difficult to argue that diverse tribunals are more likely than not to 
apply the law correctly to a dispute since, quite frankly, stare decisis 
in international arbitration is not nearly as important as it is in other 
legal worlds.202 
Or, perhaps these critics are imagining the following scenario: an 
arbitral tribunal, comprised of three older men from Western cultures, 
hears a case about a construction dispute between contractors and 
subcontractors in Africa, regarding competing contracts governed by 
an African nation’s laws, in a language that no arbitrator on the 
panel speaks. The argument in this instance would be that the 
arbitrators are less likely to understand the law because it is foreign 
to them. But critics are wise not to make this argument. Why? 
Because this line of criticism is essentially calling into question the 
intelligence or analytical reasoning of arbitrators in their abilities to 
interpret a foreign law. Interpreting a foreign law is commonplace in 
international arbitration203—even court systems around the world do 
this.204 So, to argue that non-diverse tribunals misapply law in general 
risks insulting one’s professional capacities. 
Therefore, to take the conclusions of studies that draw a direct 
line between diversity and some positive result, and to apply that 
thinking to arbitral tribunals requires some finding that the system 
right now is failing because of this lack of diversity. And critics that 
rely on this thinking simply do not point to tangible, concrete 
 
201. See generally Dolores Bentolila, Chapter 4: Arbitrators’ Constraints in 
Arbitral Decision-Making in ARBITRATORS AS LAWMAKERS (Bentolila 
ed., 2017) (explaining the contours of precedent in international 
arbitration and describing how, though no precedent exists, this by no 
means suggests that arbitrators do not look to previous decisions); But 
see, August Reinisch, Chapter VI: Investment Arbitration - The Role of 
Precedent in ICSID Arbitration, in AUSTRIAN ARBITRATION YEARBOOK 
2008 (Christian Klausegger et al. eds., 2008) (describing the importance 
of precedent in investor-state arbitration despite the fact that no 
precedent exists in international arbitration).  
202. See generally, Bentolila, supra note 201 and Reinisch, supra note 201 
(discussing the constraints on arbitrators when issuing decisions).  
203. See Dolores Bentolila, Chapter 3: Arbitrators’ Freedom in Arbitral 
Decision-Making, in ARBITRATORS AS LAWMAKERS 83 (Kluwer Law 
International ed., 2017) (detailing all of the law interpreting that 
arbitrators routinely perform in both the commercial and investor state 
contexts).  
204. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1 (“In determining foreign law, the court 
may consider any relevant material or source, including testimony, 
whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal 
Rules of Evidence.”). 
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evidence of tribunals failing in their duties because of a lack of 
diversity.205   
While this Note takes issue with the “diversity yields better 
results” conclusion, it does not disagree with these scholars’ 
assessment that diverse tribunals can help legitimize international 
arbitration. Just as citizens want to see a cross section of society 
reflected in the judiciary, so, too, some argue, should arbitral 
tribunals reflect a cross section of the business world—modern, 
creative, and diverse.206 The argument is one of public perception, too: 
a country’s judicial system should reflect those who come before it—
thus, a diverse society should be judged by a diverse bench.207 Yet 
this argument overlooks the fact that a state’s judicial system serves a 
much broader population than international arbitration.208 
International arbitration serves a very select community—primarily 
international businesses, in the context of international commercial 
arbitration.209 So, if those who judge us should resemble us, how does 
a tribunal properly resemble a corporation? In fact, parties that come 
before international tribunals are parties that have forgone their right 
to resort to a state’s judicial system.210 Do these parties have the same 
expectations of an arbitral tribunal that they would have of a state’s 
judiciary? The tension, of course, is that international arbitration, at 
its core, was an attempt to get away from a state’s judicial system.211 
Therefore, trying to close the gap between the two legal systems—the 
judiciary and international arbitration—feels somewhat wrong.  
Ultimately, once again, diversity becomes an issue with respect to 
optics. According to at least one United States senator, international 
arbitrators are not neutral judges; they are “highly-paid corporate 
 
205. See, e.g., Marques, supra note 8; Haridi, supra note 12; Ohri, supra note 
23; Mamounas, supra note 36; van Haerolte-Van Hof, supra note 99 
(Each of these analyses of diversity international arbitration 
demonstrate the common reasons given for the need to diversify 
tribunals. But not one of these authors state that tribunals somehow fail 
because of a lack of diversity). 
206. Haridi, supra note 12, at 308.  
207. Id. at 307-8. 
208. See What is International Arbitration?, INT’L ARB. INFO., 
https://www.international-arbitration-attorney.com/what-is-
international-arbitration/ [https://perma.cc/3LYN-Z6GU] 
(“International arbitration can be used to resolve any dispute that is 
considered to be ‘arbitrable,’ a term whose scope varies from State-to-
State, but which includes the majority of commercial disputes.”). 
209. Id. 
210. Id. 
211. Born, supra note 106, at 30 (explaining how, even in the 8th century up 
until today, arbitration was used to avoid the established judicial 
systems and its drawbacks).  
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lawyers [who] go back and forth between representing corporations 
one day and sitting in judgment the next….”212 Anything to help 
eradicate this belief is welcomed; anything to further this belief 
weakens international arbitration. A diverse tribunal can certainly 
strengthen the perception of legitimacy of international arbitration.213 
Just as addressing repeat appointments arguably works to help 
legitimize international arbitration’s standing in the legal world, so, 
too, does seeing tribunals that reflect the modern business world—or 
at least what we hope the modern business world to be: diverse. 
C. Cultural Differences Related to Fact Finding Is One of the Strongest 
Arguments for Diverse Tribunals.  
Perhaps the most compelling call for diversity is the way that 
culture interacts with the interpretation of facts. In essence, the 
argument is that because “[t]he same set of facts could be attributed 
different meanings because of the fact finders’ cultural backgrounds” a 
more culturally diverse arbitral tribunal will correctly apply the facts 
to the law.214 The reason why facts are of such importance, beyond 
serving the narrative of the case, is because “[f]acts always grow out 
of cultural interactions.”215 For example, “African arbitrators would 
probably not be dumbfounded by a witness who points to an orange 
identification card and calls it yellow because in many African 
cultures, yellow represents a range of colors, including orange.”216 
Pausing and reflecting on this approach to the diversity issue in 
international arbitration fills the gaps that are left open by those who 
preach the “better product” theory. It is a conceded fact that the 
majority of international arbitrators are white men from Western 
cultures.217 These arbitrators handle disputes from literally all over 
the world. We therefore are asking arbitrators to decide on large 
disputes based upon facts that possibly end up lost in cultural 
 
212. Haridi, supra note 13, at 308 (quoting Elizabeth Warren’s op-ed, 
Elizabeth Warren, Op-ed, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Clause 




[https://perma.cc/8E5H-J8MT]). It is not clear if Senator Warren has 
any experience with international arbitration, or if these remarks were 
more geared towards a political statement with respect to the Trans-
Pacific Partnership. 
213. Id. at 307.  
214. Kidane, supra note 21. 
215. Id. 
216. Id.  
217. BERWIN LEIGHTON PAISNER, supra note 39, at 4. 
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translation. It is clear, then, that “[t]he determination of fact is 
probably the most culturally sensitive step [in the arbitral process], 
but the ability to correctly determine facts is perhaps the most 
ignored of all criteria for arbitrator selection.”218 Therefore, it is not 
the arbitrator’s culture that matters. It is more the arbitrator’s ability 
to understand the cultural significance of certain facts. No survey thus 
far appears to probe this area. 
This critique instantly feels more tangible than any statement 
that diversity yields better results. Interpreting foreign laws requires a 
certain set of skills and education whereas interpreting facts correctly 
requires something much more nuanced—something that, assumedly, 
cannot be learned as easily as principles of law.219 If the facts are the 
most important part of a dispute, and arbitrator selection is the most 
important process of the arbitral proceeding, then making sure that 
the arbitrator is one who can properly comprehend and interpret the 
facts arguably creates the highest probability of a “correct result,” or 
a “better product.” Of course, this conclusion rests on multiple 
assumptions. For starters, it assumes that there is a correct result and 
an incorrect result in every proceeding. It also assumes that choosing 
the arbitrator who can best interpret facts will also correctly 
determine a dispute. Overall, though, this distinction is the missing 
link in the critiques of the arbitral tribunals that merely state that 
diversity ensures a better product.  
What the conclusion should be, instead, is that a diverse tribunal 
is more likely to interpret facts differently, and therefore possibly 
interpret the application of law to those facts in a manner different 
than a non-diverse tribunal. This conclusion might not be earth-
shattering—it might not even seem that important—however, it is 
incredibly important to make the connection from diversity to 
ramifications in order to convince people why diverse tribunals should 
be the norm and not the exception. After all, the diversity issue in 
international arbitration has a massive hurdle—convincing people to 
implement change.   
VI.  Changing Individual Behavior Remains the Largest 
Obstacle to Diversity Initiatives.  
Arguments for or against diversity aside, the largest obstacle 
remaining is implementation. Indeed, the decision on who to appoint 
as arbitrator is the party’s.220 Thus, arbitral tribunal diversity  
218. Kidane, supra note 20.  
219. See Michael Leathes, Chapter 4: Culture, in NEGOTIATION: THINGS 
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depends in part on the will of a party. Only in part, though, because 
arbitral institutions appoint arbitrators, too.221 Depending upon the 
situation, the applicable rules, and any disputes between the parties, 
the arbitral institution or an appointing authority might actively 
participate in the constitution of an arbitral tribunal.222 These 
institutions are in a far better position to exercise their powers to 
diversify tribunals. This has become a major trend in the move to 
diversify arbitral tribunals.223 While some institutions use a “closed-
list” system that allows a party only to choose an arbitrator from that 
list, 224 others have contemplated moving away from this closed-list 
system, which therefore expands the pool of potential arbitrators.225 
Whatever the method chosen, the trend right now is to demand of 
arbitral institutions to be the change—to lead the way in arbitral 
tribunal diversity.226 
The more challenging behavior to change is that of the 
individual—the client or counsel. On one side of the debate, 
proponents argue that “when selecting an arbitrator, [client’s] should 
insist on an inclusive list of potential candidates that includes at least 
one woman and one younger person. Moreover, law firms should have 
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the resources available to produce and recommend such lists.”227 Some 
worry about this approach.228 Diversity is not an end in itself, they 
argue.229 Instead, “the focus should be on promoting within the 
international-arbitration community and as international arbitrators 
the best talent, regardless of the diversity markers to which that 
talent may correspond.”230 This notion of international arbitration 
adopts a more market-based, economic theory:  
“[I]nternational arbitration, as a creature of contract, is driven 
by the user community, and users’ interest is in selecting 
arbitrators that will best represent their positions and rights, 
which includes offering predictability and consistency. So, if the 
“male, pale, and stale” presently serves that interest best, the 
user community will draw international arbitrators from that 
profile pool.”231 
Ultimately, those who take this approach do so, in part, out of a 
concern over the ramifications of implementing an “affirmative 
action” type approach to diversifying arbitral tribunals.232 
International arbitration’s popularity will decline if those who use it 
feel their freedom of choice being subordinated to diversity 
initiatives.233 Finding an organic way to maintain party autonomy 
while implementing diversity initiatives is the ultimate tension of 
“good diversity” and “bad diversity.” Good diversity is when “party 
autonomy can be married with diversity without substantial, if any, 
conflict at all.”234 Bad diversity, however, is when the imposition of 
diversity occurs to meet some quota or statistical goal.235  
Figuring out organic solutions to the diversity problem is the crux 
of it all. As discussed earlier, one of the biggest organic initiatives is 
the transparency movement regarding the arbitrator selection process. 
Another recognized approach is the “pipeline” theory.236 Women and  
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minorities in the “talent pool” of law school slowly exit their careers 
in the big law firms that dominate the international arbitration 
world.237 Thus, this “pipeline” loses its diverse qualities, leaving a 
small, select few to serve as arbitrators.238 So, fixing this “pipeline 
leak” is one possible organic solution.  
But many proponents still place the onus on the client or counsel 
to push for diverse candidates and actively change the system by their 
own power.239 But even the forward-thinking, gung-ho 
lawyer/proponent who wishes to appoint a diverse arbitrator comes 
face-to-face with the ethical conundrum: “Appointing an unqualified 
arbitrator simply because he or she is diverse would be ethically 
deficient.”240 How then, in the most organic way possible, can the 
lawyer convey to her client the need to look to those lessor known 
arbitrators—the new faces; the young buck; the arbitrators in the 
emerging talented pool who, by virtue of increased representation of 
women and minorities in the legal profession over the last several 
decades, represent the diversity that so many practitioners want to 
see? One possible solution is a conversation about money.  
VII. The Financial Incentive to Choose the Newcomer 
is an Organic Approach that can be Used to Address 
Diversity Concerns. 
In 2015, the law firm White & Case, along with Queen Mary 
University of London, published their third survey on international 
arbitration.241 The theme was “improvements and innovation” in 
international arbitration.242 One section dealt with both the time and 
cost of proceedings.243 The consensus? “Cost and lack of speed were 
both ranked by respondents as amongst the worst characteristics of 
international arbitration.”244 One of the questions in the survey 
proposed 15 innovations for the arbitral process, and asked 
respondents to rank each innovation on a one to five scale: low scores 
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were for innovations considered “not effective” and high scores were 
considered “effective” innovations.245 The five highest scoring 
innovations, starting with the highest scoring, were the following:  
1.A requirement that tribunals commit to and notify parties of 
a schedule for deliberations and delivery of final award. 
2.Stronger pre-appointment scrutiny of prospective arbitrators’ 
availability. 
3.Sanctions for dilatory conduct by parties or their counsel. 
4.A requirement for early procedural conference. 
5.A pre-hearing preparatory meeting of the arbitral tribunal.246 
Every one of these points with the exception of number three 
involves working around arbitrators’ schedules. In fact, all of these 
schedule-oriented changes make up subparts of the second point: the 
arbitrator’s availability. Recall that one of the objective factors to 
take into consideration when selecting an arbitrator is that 
arbitrator’s availability. Again, tensions appear. Practitioners want 
the big-names—the recognized arbitrators who dominate the 
industry.247 But four of the five biggest criticisms of practitioners 
revolve around scheduling concerns that can be directly traced back 
to the arbitrator’s prominence in the field, which is subsequently 
related back to the arbitrator’s availability.248  
While counsel and practitioners alike might feel the headaches of 
prolonged proceedings, delayed submission timelines, and frustrating 
attempts simply to schedule pre-hearing meetings, the true burden 
falls on the client. Not only will longer proceedings most likely lead to 
larger bills, but also the mere fact of choosing a well-known arbitrator 
means a higher arbitrator fee.249 It appears, then, that an arbitrator’s 
professional status is a point faible, felt both by counsel and client 
alike. But this weak spot is the perfect opportunity to combat, in the 
right circumstances, the diversity issue.  
Arbitrator selection is a tactical maneuver. Meeting with a client, 
and pushing for a diverse tribunal because “diversity yields better 
results” is a difficult pitch. Yes, counsel can elaborate on the interplay 
of diversity and fact-finding. But even then, that approach is filled 
with hedging language (i.e. a diverse tribunal might view facts in a 
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certain manner that could affect the application of law to those facts, 
which might result in a different conclusion than another tribunal). 
Diversity for diversity’s sake is even a harder pitch to make because 
the overriding factor has little to do with case strategy. This “bad” 
diversity can come off as virtue signaling—subordinating one’s 
tactical choices for good optics.  
But exploiting the availability issue of a potential arbitrator is the 
perfect opportunity to implement change. By showing a client that 
choosing a big-name might have its advantages, it will also lead to a 
higher arbitrator’s fee, and most likely result in scheduling concerns 
that lengthen the dispute proceedings, and increase overall costs. 
Again, some clients might not mind. But not every single proceeding 
is a “bet-the-company” dispute.  
Accordingly, when it comes to arbitrator selection, there exists a 
financial incentive to choose a newcomer. First, that arbitrator most 
likely has more time to devote to the proceeding, since theoretically 
that arbitrator is not currently involved in numerous proceedings.250 
Having an arbitrator solely devoted to one’s case, in theory, means a 
quicker turnaround time for action. Second, that arbitrator will most 
likely charge smaller fees.251 Instead of approaching a client with a list 
of diverse candidates, explaining that these candidates were chosen 
because diversity yields better results, counsel can have a 
conversation with the client about budgetary concerns. Imagine 
that—a budget constraint might actually help. If counsel can compile 
a list of suitable newcomers, and show the client that choosing from 
this list will save money and time, all while maintaining the integrity 
of the proceeding, it is hard to imagine turning down that offer.  
This potential fix is a bit like the transparency movement. It does 
not remove a party’s choice—it simply opens the arbitrator pool to 
candidates that might not have been previously considered. It does 
not require counsel or a client to give up their unfettered freedom 
with respect to arbitrator selection. But it does give counsel a great 
opportunity to provide a list of up-and-coming arbitrators—who 
hopefully represent our diverse world—and give those fresh faces the 
chance at establishing their careers. Besides, it only takes one or two 
appointments for an arbitrator to break into the international 
arbitration world. Once there, the onus is then on those newcomers to 
continue to expand the arbitrator pool, and to open doors that, for 
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Conclusion 
A lack of diversity in international arbitration is not an 
insurmountable problem. It also cannot be fixed immediately. The 
tension between party autonomy and implementation of diversity 
goals leads to valid concerns about the way in which diversity is 
sought and ultimately achieved. The benefit of finding organic 
solutions to diversity concerns is that, typically, these efforts also 
combat other problematic areas in international arbitration. 
Transparency efforts help counsel access tons of previously 
inaccessible information; transparency also helps address diversity 
concerns. Similarly, a conversation about money could help lead to a 
new face on the arbitral tribunal while driving down the costs and 
time of a proceeding. Provided that proponents continue to point to 
real, positive effects of a diverse tribunal, in a way that does not feel 
as if change is being forced upon others, skeptics will let down their 
guards and open their ears. That is what counts most anyway—
getting people to listen.  
